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1.  Introduction 
 
All modern societies spend vast resources on educating their young. It is widely 
acknowledged that spending on education is an important investment in future human capital, 
which is increasingly important for economic growth in increasingly advanced societies. 
However, there is not much consensus regarding which kind of spending that most effectively 
will improve student achievements (and thus increase future human capital) or even if simply 
increasing resources in itself will have desirable effects.
1 Given scarcity of resources it is 
important to perform policy evaluation in order to study how to spend in the most effective 
way. The activities in schools may be interpreted as a “production” of future human capital. 
Given this interpretation, a popular approach within the economist literature has been to 
formulate and estimate school production functions seeking to identify causal effects from 
different capital factors. This is a very useful approach because, if successfully implemented, 
it may give policy makers guidance as to which policies yield most benefits in form of 
improved student achievements.  
 
A good example of evaluation of resource use is the very rich literature studying effects from 
reducing the student/teacher ratio (i.e. reducing class size). In the production function analogy 
this will in essence be to increase the human capital intensity in the school production. A few 
of the contributions to this literature are seminal works by Krueger (1999) and Angrist and 
Lavy (1999) and a more recent study by Leuven et al. (2008). These are important studies 
because if reducing class size in fact boosts student achievements, it will be a fairly easy 
policy to implement (at least in the long run)
2 for policy makers. However, there are also 
obviously high costs associated with such a policy, since the need for more teachers and 
instructional space will lead to a cost increase roughly proportional to the reduction of class 
size. Notably, the literature is not conclusive with respect to the magnitude of effects from 
class size reductions. Some studies identifies significantly positive effects by reducing class 
size (e.g. Krueger, 1999 and Angrist and Lavy, 1999), whereas other studies reject even small 
                                                 
1 The debate between Hanushek and Card and Krueger on the effects of resources gives a good overview of the 
debate in the general school spending literature. Hanushek (1996) reviews more than 90 studies and concludes 
that simply increasing resources leaves little hope for improved student achievements. However, Hanushek’s 
interpretation of the literature is disputed by Card & Krueger (1996). 
2 In the short run one may be faced with a restriction due to shortage of teacher personnel. However, in the long-
run more teachers can be educated and this constraint will be less of a problem.   3
effects (e.g. Leuven et al, 2008). Thus one should also consider if there are other ways to 
spend resources that may improve student achievements.   
 
Interestingly, effects from the real capital components of the school production function have 
not been subject to much empirical study by economists. Similarly to reduction of the 
student/teacher ratio, improving infrastructure in a large scale may involve substantial 
financial costs. If schools are in poor condition initially, the need for major construction work 
gives that one will have large investments costs in the short-run. Where school building 
conditions are not critically poor initially however, it is possible that school owners to some 
extent may be able to improve long-run infrastructure conditions by increasing their 
maintenance expenditures slightly. This gives that a “better school facilities policy” does not 
necessarily imply very large expenses (except for some initial investments where this is 
necessary). Thus, the long-run cost increase from this policy is not necessarily very high.
3 
Furthermore, improving the infrastructure will also be fairly easy to organize for policy 
makers if it turns out to be an effective policy.  
 
Intuitively one would assume that in highly developed countries with no direct shortage of 
school infrastructure, human capital in form of teaching staff will have a greater impact than 
the condition of school facilities. However, the condition of school facilities has been a 
widely debated topic in the popular debate in several countries, indicating that both voters and 
policy makers consider this to be an important issue. An often observed argument is that poor 
school facilities can have negative consequences for the students’ learning environment. The 
present paper is inspired by this debate and aims to test whether poor quality of school 
facilities are associated with poor student achievements in eight OECD countries. Some 
studies suggest that improving environmental conditions may gain student achievements by 
reducing distractions and missed school days (literature reviewed by Earthman (2002) and 
Mendell and Heath (2005)). This may also benefit teachers by improving their morale and 
reducing absenteeism and turnover, indirectly affecting student achievements (Buckley et al. 
2005).    
 
                                                 
3 In fact, it is often claimed that increasing maintenance expenditures today, will actually reduce the long-run 
costs due to a slower deterioration rate of the infrastructure. See Borge and Hopland (2011), for a discussion 
about maintenance and building conditions in Norwegian local governments.   4
The closest relative to this paper is the recent study by Cellini et al. (2010). They study broad 
effects from investments in school facilities in Californian school districts using a regression 
discontinuity approach. Their findings suggest that investment in school facilities may have 
some positive long-run effects on student achievements, but that there are no effects in the 
short run. Note that their estimates are imprecise and their evidence in favor of long-run 
effects is not unambiguous. Thus they conclude that there is, at best, weak evidence in favor 
of the hypothesis that increased investments in school facilities will boost student 
achievements even in the long run.  
 
Even though their results are not unambiguous, it will still be reasonable to expect that the 
effects from physical work conditions (and investments in such) will be stronger in the long 
run than in the short run. It is unlikely that performances will have a sudden boost when 
school facilities are improved, since a student’s performances in earlier years obviously will 
affect his performances in the years ahead. Thus it will take some time before effects from the 
improved facilities are observed. We should also keep in mind that those students who are 
enrolled after the investment period will only have been exposed to the good facilities. If 
school facilities matter, these new students should then, all other things equal, perform better 
than students in earlier cohorts. Thus, the finding that effects from investment in school 
facilities on student achievements (if any at all) are stronger in the long run than in the short 
run should not come as a major surprise. In this paper I will study the link between school 
facility conditions and fourth grade students’ achievements, using data from the TIMSS. The 
TIMSS also includes a test performed in eight grade, but in most countries these students have 
recently progressed to secondary school. Thus, studying these would to a large extent be to 
measure effects from the facilities in their primary school, which we do not observe, rather 
than their present school.  
 
My main contribution to the literature is to look directly at the condition of school facilities 
rather than investments in such. Investments will obviously be correlated with the condition 
of the facilities, but far from perfectly, since the daily maintenance expenditures will also be 
an important determinant for the condition of building facilities. Investments may also capture 
other factors, such as relative price differences or taste regarding the trade off between 
maintenance and investments. Thus, where investments in school facilities may serve as a 
proxy for the quality of the school facilities, this paper utilizes a direct measure of the quality.   5
I will combine OLS regressions and matching based on propensity score in order to control 
for observable characteristics. 
 
Studies based on data from international tests, such as the TIMSS, have an advantage 
compared to studies using solely national data because of the possibility to compare results 
for several countries. One drawback of using international tests compared to national data is 
that national data are typically more detailed than the survey data connected with international 
tests. However this drawback need not be all that important since the TIMSS questionnaire 
provides useful information on students, parents, schools and school districts. A potentially 
more critical drawback for the analysis in this paper is that the TIMSS does not offer any 
credible instrumental variables to battle potential bias due to unobservable characteristics that 
may be correlated with both student achievements and the quality of the school facilities. This 
is potentially critical since both OLS and matching will be sensitive to unobservable 
characteristics.  
 
However, it is not given in which direction such may bias the estimates, as illustrated by the 
following examples. It is unlikely that all characteristics of a good teacher are observable in 
the data. Thus, if good teachers have a positive effect on student achievements and sort 
themselves into schools with good buildings, OLS will tend to overestimate negative effects 
from poor facilities. A similar effect will occur if resourceful parents sort their children into 
schools with good building conditions, since it is unlikely that the controls capture all relevant 
characteristics of the family background and peer effects. Compensatory or regressive policies 
are other potential causes of bias. If policy makers believe that school facilities are important 
for student achievements, this may lead them to upgrade school facilities where achievements 
are low. This draws towards underestimation of negative effects from poor school facilities. 
Regressive policies could occur if politicians observe that voters in school districts with poor 
student achievements are less likely to vote and will tend to bias the estimates in the opposite 
direction. Unfortunately, the TIMSS database does not provide any credible instrumental 
variables that could solve these problems. The best I can offer is an alternative approach 
based on matching on propensity scores. This method offers an alternative way to control for 
observable characteristics and differ from OLS regressions. However, like OLS it is sensitive 
to unobservable characteristics and does therefore not solve the omitted variable bias that may 
potentially be plaguing the OLS estimates. Thus, one must keep in mind that some caution is   6
required when interpreting the results of this study. The estimated coefficients in this paper 
are more a reflection of a potential association, rather than robustly identified causal effects. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we take a first look at the 
data. The empirical strategies, OLS and propensity score matching are discussed in Section 3 
before the results are presented in Section 4. The findings of the paper are summarized in 
Section 5. 
 
2.  A first look at the data 
 
The dataset consists of fourth grade students
4  from four Western European, ((Flemish) 
Belgium, Great Britain (GB in the tables), Italy and The Netherlands) and four non-European 
countries (Australia, Japan, New Zealand (NZL in the tables), and the USA) representing a 
broad specter of highly developed ‘western-like’ countries. In Great Britain, schools from 
England and Scotland are reported separately to the TIMSS database. However, due to 
missing variables, we are left with rather few observations in the multivariate analysis when 
treating them separately (roughly 60 schools in each). Thus, I choose to analyze the British 
data pooled, rather than separating the Scotsmen from the English. Fourth grade students from 
Norway also participated in the TIMSS 2003. However, the Norwegian data is missing some 
important socio-economic control variables and I therefore have chosen to not include the 
Norwegian schools in the analysis. 
 
The non-European countries in the analysis have similar attributes (rich and democratic 
market economies) as the Western European countries. In order to have a ground for 
comparison across countries one should have countries that are fairly similar at least with 
respect to economic conditions. This is because principals in very poor countries may have 
very different perceptions of what is to consider as poor or good facilities than their 
colleagues in richer countries.  
 
                                                 
4 The countries report results from the cohorts with the largest share of nine and thirteen year old students. For 
most countries this is the grades four and eight respectively and even though there is some variation across 
countries, the TIMSS simply refers to fourth and eight grade.   7
Each country draws the participating schools from a stratified sample, to ensure a 
representative sample of schools. Further, within each of the schools, generally one class from 
the fourth grade is randomly chosen to get a representative student sample
5. The database, in 
addition to test results, also includes rich information from questionnaires answered by 
students, teachers and principals. From these I obtain the key explanatory variables and 
control variables used in the analysis. The key explanatory variables are based on the 
following question from the principals’ questionnaire: Is your school’s capacity to provide 
instruction affected by a shortage or inadequacy of school buildings and grounds? (Question 
23c). The following answers are possible: 1: none, 2: a little, 3: some or 4: a lot.  
 
In the econometric specification I will use two different formulations based on this index. 
Firstly, I will apply a flexible formulation where I include dummies for each of the categories, 
using the best buildings as reference category. Secondly, I will introduce a poor facilities 
dummy (pbuild) which equals one if the school is reported to be in category 2, 3 or 4. We then 
simply compare all schools with good facilities to those which have unsatisfying facilities, 
asking: Are poor school facilities associated with poor student achievements? 
 
Table 1 About here 
 
Table 1 summarizes the percentage of schools reported to be in each of the categories and 
descriptive statistics for the poor facilities dummy, which is simply one minus the share of 
schools in the best category. We observe that there is sufficiently spread along the categories 
to give meaningful variation, even though all countries have a majority of their schools 
reported in one of the two best categories. Japan and New Zealand have the highest 
proportion of schools in one of the two best categories, with 88 % and 86 % of the schools 
respectively. In the other end we find Italy (52 %) and the Netherlands (56 %).   
 
The observation that most schools are in fairly good condition is not very surprising given that 
the study targets wealthy countries exclusively. Since it in the analysis is only the very best 
category that is used as reference we also note that New Zealand has by far most schools in 
this category (62 %) in front of the USA (54 %) and Japan (51 %). Italy is dead last with only 
26 % of the schools reported to be in the best category.  
                                                 
5 Further details on the practical sampling can be found in Beaton et al. (1996) and Martin and Kelly (1997).     8
 
In TIMSS, student performance in mathematics and science is tested separately using 
international achievement scores with an international mean of 500 and an international 
standard deviation of 100. Summary statistics for the test scores are reported in the upper part 
of Table 2. I will transform the results into ‘school contributions’. The transformation takes 
place by running regressions where school fixed effects are included together with variables 
describing the student’s individual and family characteristics as presented in Equation (1).
6 
Similar approaches are used by Borge and Naper (2006), Fiva and Rønning (2008) and Naper 
(2010). 
 
                                                            ij ij j ij y u    Z                                                           (1) 
 
ij y   is the test score for student i  in school j, the vector  ij Z   includes observable student 
characteristics and family background,  j   represents school fixed effects and  ij u  is an error 
term. The student characteristics include a dummy which equals one if the student is a girl and 
a dummy indicating whether the student is native to the country. The family background 
variables include a dummy indicating whether the student’s father is a foreigner and an index 
indicating the approximate number of books in the family’s home. The latter of these are to be 
considered as a proxy for the educational level in the home and the socio-economic status of 
the family. Descriptive statistics and a closer description of the variables are given in the 
Appendix.  
 
The school fixed effects (the α’s) may be interpreted as the average test score in the school, 
adjusted for student characteristics and family background. In this paper the expressions 
adjusted test scores and school contribution are synonymous, and both refer to the school 
fixed effects. Since the observable individual and family characteristics are accounted for in 
the adjusted test score they will play no role in the further analyses. Note that using estimated 
variables in the regressions will in general introduce measurement errors. Measurement errors 
in the dependent variable will increase the variance of the OLS estimates, but not introduce 
additional bias. Descriptive statistics for the adjusted test scores are presented in the lower 
parts of Table 2.  
                                                 
6 The estimations of the school contributions are reported in the Appendix.   9
 
The averages are zero by definition since the average school is the benchmark, while poorer 
and better schools have negative and positive effects on student achievements respectively. 
Note however that the standard deviation varies significantly between the countries and also 
to some extent between the tests within the countries. While Belgium, Japan and the 
Netherlands have standard deviations below or just over 20 for both adjusted test scores, the 
standard deviations are in the 30s in Australia, Great Britain and the USA. Italy and New 
Zealand have the highest standard deviations on both adjusted test scores, with standard 
deviations well above 40.  
 
In Australia, Belgium, Great Britain, Japan and the Netherlands we observe a higher standard 
deviation in adjusted test scores in mathematics than in science while the opposite is observed 
in the USA. In Italy and New Zealand we observe almost identical standard deviations on the 
two adjusted test scores. Importantly, these figures illustrate that there is still a considerable 
amount of variation to analyze, even though we are now only considering the school 
contributions rather than the raw test scores. 
 
Table 2 About here 
 
3. Empirical strategies 
 
I start out by estimating a standard school production function using OLS 
 
                                                    0 jj b j x j u      X   b                                                      (2) 
 
where  j   is the adjusted test scores, the vector  j b  includes the measure(s) of school facilities 
and the vector  b   includes the coefficient(s) of interest. Further,  j X  is a vector of school 
specific controls. The vector includes variables describing teacher and school district 
characteristics. The information about the school and school district includes a variable 
indicating the number of inhabitants and the size of the cohort. To capture the general 
resource situation in the school a dummy indicating whether the school suffers from a 
shortage of teachers is included. This is constructed the same way as the building condition 
dummy from a similar index.    10
 
As measures of teacher characteristics I use the length of the teacher’s education, a dummy 
indicating whether or not the teacher has a licence to teach and the teacher’s tenure. To 
account for peer group effects I include the share of economically disadvantaged and 
economically affluent families with children in the school. Finally, I include the number of 
students in the mathematics or science class, depending on which test is analyzed. Descriptive 
statistics and closer definitions of the controls are presented in the Appendix. 
 
Further I will use matching based on propensity score, as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) to check the robustness of the OLS estimates. This method will only be applied on the 
one-dummy formulation, following the algorithm programmed by Becker and Ichino (2002). 
Following the terminology from the evaluation literature, the outcome studied is the school 
contribution,  j   for school j. Having poor facilities is considered as a treatment. School j 
either has  pbuild 1 j   or  pbuild 0 j  . The school contribution for school j is denoted 
 1 j   if the school has poor facilities, and    0 j   if the school has good facilities.  
 
My primary interest is whether poor facilities affect the school contribution, i.e. the 
difference    10 jj   . The fundamental problem is that we do not observe both 
  1  and  0 jj    for the same school. The statistical challenge is the possible sample 
selection bias since schools with good facilities may not be representative of those with poor 
facilities in the counterfactual situation with good facilities. Decomposition of the raw 
comparison of average/expected school contributions for schools with poor and good school 
facilities, clarifies the selection bias: 
 
       
     
  
1 pbuild 1 0 pbuild 0 1 0 pbuild 1
0 pbuild 1 0 pbuild 0






              
      
            (3) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side defines the treatment effect of interest, i.e. the average 
treatment effect of poor school facilities in the schools with poor facilities. This is referred to 
as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The second term reflects the bias that   11
occurs if the school contribution of schools with good facilities is not representative for the 
school contribution of the schools with poor facilities if their facilities were good.  
 
If the assignment of schools into treatment is random, the second term equals zero and there is 
no such bias. However, the economic priorities which determine the quality of school 
facilities are not random, and there may be systematic differences between schools with poor 
and good facilities. Propensity score matching and OLS are two different solutions to this 
problem, since they allow us to control for observable characteristics.  
 
As OLS regressions, matching assumes selection on observables. However, Angrist (1998) 
compares the methods regression and matching and shows that the methods yield different 
results. The differences occur because the observations are weighted differently, hence the 
methods will generate different results, even when controlling for the same characteristics.  
 
Technically the difference origins from that while the estimated coefficients from regressions 
reflect variance-weighted averages, the matching estimator generates weights that are 
proportional to the probability of the treatment (here: poor school facilities) given the 
observed characteristics. Thus there may be some value added in applying matching in 
addition to OLS, even though it does not solve potential problems due to unobservable 
characteristics. 
 
Matching is frequently used to evaluate policy programs, and is based on a comparison of 
treated and non-treated observations. As opposed to most policy evaluation I have no pre-
treatment observations, since I only observe school facilities at a fixed point in time. However, 
this is not a critical shortcoming for the analysis. Persson (2001), Persson and Tabellini 
(2002) and Borge and Rattsø (2008) also use matching in situations with no pre-treatment 
observations.  
 
The main idea in matching is to approach the evaluation of causal effects the same way as in a 
controlled experiment. The data is therefore split into two groups; ‘treated’  pbuild 1   and 
‘non-treated’ or ‘control’  pbuild 0    observations. The unobservable counterfactual 
outcome for a given treated observation is then estimated from the outcome among otherwise 
similar, but non-treated observations.    12
 
When the schools that are compared are similar, the selection with respect to the treatment 
should to a large extent be random, as in an experiment. Successful matching thus removes 
bias due to systematic selection. The key assumption for the matching analysis is that 
selection into treatment depends only on the vector of observables,  . j X  Alternatively, 
selection into poor school facilities is random conditioned on the observables. If this is 
fulfilled we obtain 
 
                          0 pbuild 0, 0 pbuild 1, jj j jj j EE        XX                                    (4) 
 
where  j   is the school contribution in school j. Given (3) we can define the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) as 
 
                    1 pbuild 1, 0 pbuild 0, pbuild 1 jj j j j j j ATT E E E            XX        (5) 
 
The outer expectation in Equation (5) is over the distribution of the characteristics of the 
schools with poor facilities. The counterfactual school contribution for a specific school with 
poor facilities can be estimated from the outcome for schools with good facilities, but similar 
characteristics.  
 
The remaining problem is that  j X   may contain several continuous controls and that this 
problem with dimensionality is likely to make the matching strategy impossible to implement 
in practice. However Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if conditioning on  j X  
eliminates selection bias, then conditioning on   j p X , where p is the probability of having a 
school with poor facilities achieves the same: 
 
               1 pbuild 1, 0 pbuild 0, pbuild 1 jj j j j j j ATT E E p E p            XX     (6) 
 
Schools with the same probability of having poor facilities will have the same distribution of 
the full vector of control variables. This probability is called the propensity score. The   13
propensity score can be estimated using any standard model for estimation of probabilities 
(here: probit). In order to avoid a biased estimate for the propensity score, the vector of 
explanatory variables in the probit should consist of those variables that are expected to affect 
both the outcome (adjusted test scores) and the probability of treatment (poor school facilities).  
Hence, I include all the control variables from the OLS analysis in the propensity score 
equation (the same vector  j X  is used in both analyses).  
 
The results from the estimation of the propensity score are reported in the Appendix. We 
observe that the vector  j X  do not have much explanatory power and that most variables 
included are insignificant. Importantly, we have that the balancing property is satisfied for all 
countries. The balancing property of the probit specification is essential for the comparison of 
test results. The test checks whether the explanatory variables are different for schools with 
buildings in good condition compared to those with poor buildings given that they have 
approximately the same propensity score.  
 
The first step is to stratify all schools into blocks such that the propensity score does not differ 
significantly between schools with poor and good buildings within each block. The second 
step is to test whether the mean of the explanatory variables differ significantly between 





Table 3 About here 
 
Table 4 About here 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present results from OLS regressions. In the regressions in the upper part, I 
have included dummies for each of the three least favorable categories, leaving the schools 
with the best facilities as reference. In the lower parts of the table I include the poor facilities 
dummy as the key explanatory variable. We observe from Tables 3 and 4 that the dummies 
for each of the non-optimal categories are in general negative, but mostly insignificant. 
Interestingly, it does not appear to be a linear development, where the adjusted test scores   14
become gradually lower as the facilities deteriorate. Thus, including the facilities index 
linearly in the regressions will not be a valid simplification. However, it does seem that the 
one-dummy formulation is a reasonable simplification of the model.  
 
Given the intuitive interpretation, and the fact that it seems to be a reasonable simplification, I 
will base the remainder of the discussion on the results from the one-dummy formulation. 
Interestingly, we observe that the coefficients for the poor facilities dummy do not change 
dramatically when moving from the simple regressions (Table 3) to the regressions where the 
rich vector of controls are included (Table 4). That the coefficient for the poor facilities 
dummy is not heavily biased by exclusion of observable characteristics of the controls is 
interesting. This may also indicate that it is not heavily biased by unobservable characteristics 
of these. However this observation is, of course, not to be interpreted as evidence that OLS 
provides unbiased estimates.    
 
When using the poor facilities dummy in the multiple regressions I find that for 5 out of 8 
countries there are no significant coefficients The results in these countries differ quite a lot 
and are also very imprecisely estimated, typically with t-values well below one in absolute 
value. Thus, it is for these countries difficult to identify any clear patterns.  
 
When estimating the Japanese test scores I only find significant effects from the poor facilities 
dummy on the adjusted test scores in science. The coefficient value indicates a negative 
treatment effect from poor facilities of roughly 32 % of a standard deviation. However, even 
though the effect seems strong in terms of standard deviations when estimating adjusted 
science test scores, we also note that the estimated effect on the adjusted test scores in 
mathematics is not significant. Thus, the results for Japan are also only vaguely supporting the 
hypothesis that school facilities matter for student achievements.  
 
In the multiple regressions for Australia, I find a significantly negative coefficient for the poor 
facilities dummy when estimating both adjusted test scores. However, the estimates are not 
very precise and only significant at the 10 % level. On face value, the coefficient values 
indicate a treatment effect from poor facilities of about 31 % and 29 % of a standard deviation 
on adjusted scores in mathematics and science respectively.  
   15
When estimating the school contributions in the Dutch sample, I also find significantly 
negative coefficients for the dummy on both test scores in the multiple regressions. In terms 
of standard deviation, the effects are roughly 33 % and 34 % for adjusted test scores in 
mathematics and science respectively. Thus, the Dutch and Australian estimations are the 
ones that provide the strongest support for the hypothesis, since we observe significantly 
negative effects from poor facilities on both tests. For these countries there seems to be 
clearly negative effects from poor school facilities. Interestingly, the effect seems not to be 
especially sensitive to exclusion of the large set of controls.   
 
Table 5 About here 
 
Finally, Table 5 presents the results from the propensity score matching to test the robustness 
of the OLS analysis. There are several methods available for testing whether there are 
significantly different test results between treated and non-treated schools. I have applied the 
nearest neighbor method as programmed by Becker and Ichino (2002). This method is 
intuitively appealing since it matches each treated unit with the control unit that has the 
closest propensity score and all treated units will find a match. The main picture still remains, 
all estimates are negative or insignificantly positive. The only counter-intuitive positive 
estimates are found in Great Britain and the USA. We note that these are very imprecise 
estimates with t-values well below one on all four estimates, and actually less than a half for 
three out of the four.  
 
Due to the low correlation between the vector  j X  and the facility indicators the matching 
estimates are in general less precise than the OLS estimates. Thus, the only significant 
coefficient obtained from this method is when estimating the adjusted test scores in science in 
the Dutch sample. On face value the negative treatment effect from poor school buildings on 
adjusted test score correspond to roughly 45 % of a standard deviation. Note however that the 
effect is not very precisely estimated and is only significant on the 10 % level.  
  
The finding that the vector  j X  is only weakly correlated with the building conditions is also 
consistent with the findings in the regression analyses. We remember from the regressions 
that the estimated coefficients for the poor facilities dummy did not change much from the 
simple to the multiple regressions where the rich vector of controls ( j X ) was included. The   16
finding that the OLS estimates are not severely biased when excluding observable 
characteristics of teachers and school districts may indicate that OLS will also be fairly robust 
to the exclusion of any unobservable features of these important factors. Unfortunately, I have 
no credible instruments available and it is therefore not possible to formally test whether this 
is actually the case.  
 
However, if bias due to unobservable characteristics is not a major issue, both OLS and 
propensity score matching will provide estimates that are not heavily biased. Further, since 
the vector  j X  is only weakly correlated with the condition of the school facilities, the OLS 
estimates will be the most precise. Thus, these should be considered as the main results of the 
analysis.  
 
Anyway, neither of the methods provides evidence in favor of the hypothesis that poor school 
facilities are significantly associated with poor student achievements for most of the countries. 
The exceptions are Australia and Japan where I obtain significant coefficients for the poor 
facilities dummy when using OLS, and the Netherlands where I find significantly negative 
estimates when using both OLS and matching. The low significance in most of the countries 
may come from that the difference between the schools in the different building condition 
categories is simply too small for it to matter for student achievements.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper attempts to study the importance of the school facilities within a school production 
function framework. To my knowledge this is the first paper which studies this issue directly 
and the paper is inspired by the ongoing popular debate about school building conditions in 
several countries. The analysis focuses on the link between the quality of school facilities and 
student achievements in eight countries and is based on data from the TIMSS database.  
 
The empirical strategies used are OLS and matching on propensity scores. The methods offer 
two alternative ways to control for observable characteristics but are both sensitive to sorting 
on unobservable characteristics. Unfortunately, the TIMSS database does not offer any 
credible instruments for the quality of school facilities, making the results sensitive to sorting   17
on unobservable characteristics. Thus one should interpret the coefficients in this study with 
some caution, since I estimate associations rather than strictly identified causations.   
 
The OLS estimates indicate that there may exist a negative link between poor school facilities 
and student achievements. However, the estimated coefficients are mostly insignificant and 
the results provide, at best, very weak support for the hypothesis that school facilities affect 
student achievements. Further a procedure with matching based on propensity score is 
introduced as an alternative procedure to control for observable characteristics. Similar to 
OLS, the estimates are mostly negative. However, the precision of the estimates are lower 
when using matching, leaving only one significantly negative estimate, and thus even less 
support for the hypothesis than the OLS estimates. The lack of significance may origin from 
that the difference between the school facilities within the different categories is simply not 
sufficiently large for them to affect student achievements in a rich country like the ones in this 
study.    18
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Tables in main text 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the key explanatory  
Distribution of answers                 
 Australia  Belgium  GB  Italy  Japan  Netherlands  NZL  USA 
None (Cat 1)  44 %  49 %  37 %  26 %  51 %  36 %  62 %  54 % 
A little (Cat 2)  26 %  23 %  37 %  26 %  37 %  20 %  24 %  23 % 
Some (Cat 3)  20 %  16 %  18 %  33 %  8 %  29 %  10 %  17 % 
A lot (Cat 4)  10 %  12 %  8 %  15 %  4 %  15 %   4 %  6 % 
                
Poor buildings (pbuild) average  0.56  0.51  0.63  0.74  0.49  0.64  0.38  0.46 
(St. dev.)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.48)  (0.44)  (0.50)  (0.48)  (0.49)  (0.50) 
                

























   ii
Table 2. Summary statistics for test scores 
        Australia         Belgium            GB         Italy       Japan            Netherlands   NZL      USA  
                    
  Math Science Math Science Math Science Math Science Math Science Math Science Math Science  Math  Science 
                     
Average score  499.55 523.89 551.95 520.35 509.47 519.42 501.32 514.22 565.60 544.70 541.92 526.05 494.33 520.03  512.49  528.74 
(Standard deviation)  (75.54) (75.31) (54.83) (49.65) (82.16) (79.16) (78.85) (80.81) (70.27) (68.87)  50.62  (47.69) (81.60) (82.03)  (73.81)  (78.13) 
Observations  5219 5219  10067  10067  8757 8757 4282 4282 5322 5322 2937 2937 8502 8502 18448 18448 
Number of schools  204 204 149 149 248 248 171 171 150 150 130 130 220 220  248  248 


































                     
Average score  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
(Standard deviation)  (36.58) (32.48) (19.85) (17.03) (39.07) (37.31) (45.37) (46.68) (20.11) (18.05) (18.20) (16.74) (43.07) (43.34)  (34.34)  (37.10) 
Observations  4480 4480 9592 9592 8285 8285 3852 3852 5014 5014 2675 2675 6473 6473 17510 17510 
























Table 3. Estimation of test results. OLS without controls. 
              Australia           Belgium           GB                Italy               Japan  
           
Netherlands           NZL              USA  


































                       
Cat2 (second best)  -3.097  -3.584 1.633 2.812 -1.673 1.071  -18.24*  -16.15 -1.061  -6.236  -4.174 -4.348 5.271 5.050  -12.62**  -4.046 
  (6.521)  (6.094) (3.076) (2.680) (6.781) (6.296) (10.23) (10.86)  (4.758)  (3.920)  (3.362)  (3.707) (7.875) (7.598) (6.305) (6.853) 
Cat3   -19.01**  -16.37**  4.929 3.485 3.626 6.868 3.227 6.983 -2.484 -8.513* -8.923*  -6.091  0.756 -0.219 2.553 -1.535 
  (8.191)  (6.695) (4.260) (3.711) (7.524) (7.792) (10.82) (11.56)  (4.315)  (4.831)  (4.969)  (4.180) (8.460) (8.960) (5.717) (6.195) 
Cat4 (worst)  -14.37**  -7.239 -15.22** -8.495  -8.264  -9.498  -6.422  -0.136 -9.903  -10.67  -6.710 -5.536 7.103 3.521 -10.16 -10.92 
  (6.369)  (6.663) (6.870) (5.988) (22.53) (22.89) (12.93) (13.63)  (7.324)  (6.823)  (5.129)  (4.423) (12.32) (12.93) (12.55) (12.97) 
R-squared  0.043  0.034 0.085 0.044 0.006 0.012 0.037 0.037  0.011  0.042  0.039  0.025 0.003 0.003 0.027 0.006 
                          
Pbuild  -10.60* -8.471*  -1.259 0.326 -1.310 0.930 -6.561  -2.803 -2.197 -7.086**  -6.782**  -5.365* 4.072  3.287  -6.272  -4.076 
  (5.477)  (4.924) (3.229) (2.751) (6.983) (6.780) (9.709) (10.43)  (3.884)  (3.294)  (3.392)  (2.997) (6.226) (6.173) (4.927) (5.254) 
R-squared  0.020  0.017 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001  0.003  0.038  0.031  0.023 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.003 
No. of schools  199  199 146 146 204 204 171 171  150  150  118  118 212 212 221 221 
No. of students  4,405  4,405 9,412 9,412 6,889 6,889 3,852 3,852  5,014  5,014  2,447  2,447 6,348 6,348 15,579  15,579 
Note: Robust standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering) in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
















T a b l e   4 .   E s t i m a t i o n   o f   t e s t   r e s u l t s .   O L S .               
        Australia         Belgium            GB         Italy             Japan           Netherlands        NZL            USA  


































                     
Cat2 (second best)  -8.843 -8.860 0.774 2.006 1.132 1.171  -17.80*  -14.75 1.337  -5.270*  -6.654**  -7.594*  -1.243 7.617  -8.809*  1.311 
  (7.154) (6.037) (3.118) (2.861) (6.824) (6.240) (10.19) (10.95) (4.413)  (3.172)  (3.321) (3.892) (6.627) (4.760) (4.489) (4.584) 
Cat3  -18.06**  -14.13*  4.943 4.285 6.490 5.690 3.012 6.822 -1.375 -10.58* -2.683 -1.368 -1.239  -4.096 1.019 -0.110 
  (7.785) (7.335) (4.236) (3.642) (9.697) (7.858) (10.79) (11.39) (6.495)  (5.689)  (3.947) (3.921) (7.265) (7.073) (4.967) (5.089) 
Cat4 (worst)  -5.447 -2.446 -2.774 4.622 8.183 0.448 -3.009 3.629 -0.905  -2.324  -9.111*  -8.819* 0.867 -7.209 -13.81  -17.80** 
  (7.391) (6.406) (5.681) (4.417) (9.657) (9.443) (14.07) (14.75) (5.761)  (6.099)  (5.223) (4.666) (11.13) (9.430) (8.912) (9.011) 
R-squared  0.308 0.305 0.285 0.270 0.316 0.273 0.116 0.135 0.097  0.220  0.359 0.265 0.445 0.452 0.536 0.584 
                     
Pbuild  -11.25*  -9.303*  1.409 3.369 3.029 2.165 -5.622  -1.457 0.695 -5.856**  -5.951**  -5.723*  -1.020 2.131 -6.160 -2.798 
  (5.730) (5.068) (2.791) (2.435) (6.725) (5.795) (9.921) (10.63) (3.800)  (2.888)  (2.961) (3.044) (4.994) (4.678) (3.811) (3.814) 
R-squared  0.298 0.297 0.276 0.267 0.312 0.270 0.085 0.102 0.096  0.213  0.347 0.244 0.445 0.441 0.524 0.567 
School district controls  + + + + + + + + +  +  + + + + + + 
Teacher controls  + + + + + + + + +  +  + + + + + + 
Social controls  + + + + + + + + +  +  + + + + + + 
No. of schools  156 155 134 134 119 120 171 171 136  137  96  96  171 156 172 168 
No. of students  3,150 3,026 4,360 4,251 3,488 3,465 3,848 3,848 3,843  3,879  1,985 1,985 2,469 2,250  10,562  10,234 
Note: Robust standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering) in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  













Table 5. Propensity score matching analysis. Treatment is pbuild.  
           Australia             Belgium               GB                 Italy              Japan              Netherlands            NZL            USA  



































Nearest neighbor  -3.19 -1.69 -4.08 -0.42 4.47  7.75 -8.97  -0.52  -2.93  -5.42 -6.54 -7.55*  -11.06  -12.02  1.88  3.15 
  (10.30)  (9.25) (4.82) (4.03)  (10.87)  (10.09) (13.69)  (13.71) (4.14)  (4.36)  (4.47) (4.21)  (8.90)  (8.03)  (7.29)  (7.55) 
Treated  88 88 67 67 81 81  127  127  66  66 58  58 68  68 79 79 
Non-treated  38 38 39 39 26 26 31  31  28  28 22  22 44  44 43 43 
Blocks  5 5 4 4 8 8 5  5  5  5 5  5 4  4 5 5 
Bal. prop. (1%)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Common support  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  











   VI
Appendix: Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics. Control variables.   
VARIABLES Australia    Belgium  GB  Italy  Japan  Netherlands  NZL  USA 
Books   3.46  3.00  3.21  2.62  2.77  3.10  3.22  2.95 
 (1.16)  (1.07)  (1.24)  (1.20)  (1.07)  (1.14)  (1.18)  (1.22) 
Observations 5090  9857  8537  4229  5290  2878  8289  18067 
Native 0.84  0.93  0.84  0.96  0.98  0.93  0.84  0.79 
 (0.36)  (0.25)  (0.36)  (0.20)  (0.12)  (0.25)  (0.37))  (0.41) 
Observations 4925  9867  8492  3943  5240  2812  6909  18124 
Foreign father  0.30  0.15  0.14  0.08  0.01  0.16  0.28  0.25 
 (0.46)  (0.35)  (0.34)  (0.27)  (0.10)  (0.37)  (0.45)  (0.43) 
Observations 4584  9817  8401  4110  5083  2715  6803  17872 
Girl 0.50  0.50  0.50  0.48  0.49  0.49  0.49  0.50 
 (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50) 
Observations 5219  10067  8757  4282  5322  2937  8502  18448 
Number of students in math class  26.31  20.58  27.98  20.33  32.69  23.94  27.47  23.59 
 (6.32)  (4.44)  (6.10)  (4.10)  (5.60)  (5.71)  (5.05)  (5.45) 
Observations 4553  4938  6022  4278  4499  2728  3929  15097 
Number of students in science class  26.67  20.60  27.99  20.33  32.72  23.94  27.73  23.98 
 (6.32)  (4.29)  (5.87)  (4.10)  (5.60)  (5.71)  (4.91)  (6.02) 
Observations 4440  4870  5960  4278  4535  2728  3596  14706 
Size of cohort (divided by ten)  5.81  4.45  5.59  11.53  8.33  3.46  5.41  10.07 
 (3.00)  (1.98)  (3.24)  (4.62)  (3.86)  (1.58)  (2.97)  (5.50) 
Observations 5053  9829  6982  4282  5322  2472  8352  15989 
Inhabitants in school district   3.24  4.01  3.44  3.76  2.70  3.68  3.14  3.51 
 (1.74)  (1.14)  (1.42)  (1.34)  (1.37)  (1.17)  (1.72)  (1.51) 
Observations 4958  9697  6684  4282  5210  2630  8062  15789 
Teacher’s tenure (years)  16.72  16.37  14.12 21.21  19.31 16.16  11.79 13.03 
 (9.53)  (9.87)  (10.45)  (9.44)  (9.52)  (12.42)  (9.84)  (10.19) 
Observations 4568  9777  6420  4282  5322  2698  7599  16430 
Teacher’s education   4.99  4 5.08  2.51  4.79  4.00 4.74  5.53 
 (0.71)  (0)  (0.27)  (1.12)  (0.69)  (0.31)  (0.63)  (0.50) 
Observations 4711  9849  6450  4282  5288  2705  7764  16318 
License to teach (1: yes, 0: no)  0.82  0.98  0  0.97  0.98  0  0.86  (0.86) 
 (0.39)  (0.15)  (0)  (0.18)  (0.15)  (0)  (0.34)  (0.34) 
Observations 5219  10067  8757  4282  5322  2937  8502  18448 
Teacher shortage   0.27  0.05 0.29  0.17 0.59  0.12 0.61  0.20 
 (0.44)  (0.22)  (0.45)  (0.38)  (0.49)  (0.32)  (0.49)  (0.40) 
Observations 5083  9671  7236  4282  5305  2553  8270  16255 
Share of poor families in school  1.98  1.46  2.09  1.81  1.26  1.57  2.09  2.82 
 (1.11)  (0.83)  (1.14)  (0.89)  (0.51)  (0.99)  (1.21)  (1.25) 
Observations 5153  9857  6878  4282  5182  2673  7774  16557 
Share of rich families in school  2.05  3.49  2.45  2.11  2.96  2.98  2.39  1.92 
 (1.19)  (0.87)  (1.26)  (1.51)  (1.17)  (1.19)  (1.28)  (1.11) 
Observations 4803  9633  6624  4282  5006  2542  7818  15072 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.  Books is a 1-6 index indicating the number of books in the student’s 
home, where 1 is least and 6 is most books. The inhabitants in the school district index run from 1-6, where 1 
indicates the largest and 6 the smallest districts. The teacher’s education is a 1-6 index indicating the highest 
education the teacher has finished (1 is low, 6 is high). The teacher shortage dummy indicates whether the school 
to some extent suffers from teacher shortage, and equals one if the principal has reported value 2, 3 or 4 on 
question 23r. For more details, see the TIMSS background questionnaires: 
http://timss.bc.edu/timss2003i/context.html. 




Table A2: Estimation of adjusted test scores 
        Australia         Belgium            GB         Italy           Japan         Netherlands              NZL           USA  
Variables (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G) (H) (I)  (J) (K) (L) (M)  (N)  (O)  (P) 
  Math    Science    Math  Science  Math  Science  Math Science Math Science Msth Science  Math  Science  Math  Science 
         
 
            
 
Books   10.38***  13.04*** 8.739***  8.898***  12.41***  12.11***  5.760*** 6.961*** 15.70*** 13.38*** 9.654*** 8.012***  13.85***  12.27*** 9.372*** 8.726*** 
 (1.042)  (1.158)  (0.822) (0.822) (0.795) (0.786) (0.917) (0.959) (1.177) (1.140) (0.864) (0.881) (1.137)  (1.190) (0.627) (0.609) 
Native  5.357  3.392  21.38*** 17.84*** 44.85*** 36.31*** 24.75***  21.53***  48.07***  37.76***  5.421  8.546** 5.799  8.624*  39.90***  39.29*** 
 (3.660)  (3.738)  (3.660) (3.653) (2.747) (2.471) (6.292) (6.919) (10.08) (12.05) (4.212) (3.597) (3.886)  (4.395) (1.959) (1.925) 
Foreign 
father 
4.143* 0.116  -16.04***  -10.67***  -17.50***  -19.06***  -28.23***  -26.89*** 3.912  -19.16 -14.54***  -17.10***  8.238***  7.969**  -3.302* -
8.982*** 
 (2.473)  (2.540)  (2.627) (2.420) (2.880) (2.923) (4.172) (4.496) (12.16) (12.99) (2.883) (3.237) (3.087)  (3.222) (1.824) (1.800) 




 (2.382)  (2.639)  (1.636) (1.378) (1.897) (1.833) (2.154) (2.361) (2.266) (2.363) (1.617) (1.618) (2.390)  (2.349) (1.285) (1.322) 
 
                         
Observations  4,480  4,480 9,592  9,592  8,285  8,285  3,852 3,852 5,014 5,014 2,675 2,675  6,473  6,473  17,510  17,510 
No. of 
schools 
203  0.051 0.067  0.067  0.126  0.110  0.047 0.040 0.068 0.053 0.069 0.070  0.056  0.046  0.109  0.101 
R-squared  0.041  203 149  149  246  246  171 171 150 150 130 130  218  218  248  248 
Note: Robust standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering) in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Constant term (not reported) and school fixed effects included  VIII
Table A3: Estimation of propensity score. Treatment is pbuild. Probit.  
 
 Australia  Belgium  GB  Italy  Japan  Netherlands  NZL  USA 
Treatment Pbuild  Pbuild  Pbuild
  Pbuild Pbuild  Pbuild  Pbuild Pbuild 
Size of cohort  0.449 -0.919  0.267  0.340 -0.00515  0.357  0.0594 -0.0568 
  (0.299) (0.850)  (0.475)  (0.270)  (0.338) (0.760)  (0.263)  (0.114) 
(Size of cohort)^2  -0.0620 0.215  -0.0487  -0.0227 -0.0180  -0.0744 -0.0150 -0.00112 
  (0.0429) (0.195)  (0.0778)  (0.0272)  (0.0394) (0.162)  (0.0435) (0.00811) 
(Size of cohort)^3  0.00248 -0.0145  0.00255  0.000526  0.00106 0.00510 0.000698 7.75e-05 
  (0.00181) (0.0134)  (0.00372)  (0.000814) (0.00143) (0.0100)  (0.00209) (0.000157)
Inhabitants in school  0.0915 -0.110 -0.0779  0.00983  -0.00356  -0.0667 -0.0392  0.0668 
District  (0.0650) (0.104)  (0.0917)  (0.0897)  (0.0954) (0.139)  (0.0628) (0.0704) 
Teacher’s tenure  0.00266 -0.00427 -0.00397  0.0126  0.0276** -0.0121  0.00780  0.00429 
  (0.0110) (0.0111)  (0.0118)  (0.0117)  (0.0139) (0.0113)  (0.0114)  (0.0103) 
Teacher’ education  -0.0157  ()  -0.703 0.129  -0.273 ()  0.0609 0.0260 
  (0.154)  ()  (0.552) (0.121)  (0.185)  ()  (0.174) (0.215) 
License to teach  -0.203  () ()  -0.0873  () ()  -0.454 -0.454 
  (0.346) ()  ()  (0.511)  () ()  (0.430) (0.414) 
Teacher shortage  0.687*** 0.320  0.731**  0.326  0.645*** 0.563  0.345*  0.803*** 
  (0.258) (0.475)  (0.298)  (0.312)  (0.241) (0.447)  (0.201)  (0.275) 
Share of poor families  -0.0156 -0.0838  -0.0711  0.193  0.562** -0.0741 -3.66e-05  0.138 
in school  (0.115) (0.150)  (0.137)  (0.134)  (0.254) (0.173)  (0.100)  (0.106) 
Share of rich families  -0.145 -0.194 0.0850  -0.0405  -0.00206  -0.0237  0.153  0.0562 
in school  (0.101) (0.138)  (0.126)  (0.0970)  (0.107) (0.136) (0.0945) (0.113) 
Students in class  0.0237 0.00709 -0.00443 -0.00750 0.00904 0.00149  0.0369  -0.00209 
(average of science and math class)  (0.0185) (0.0277)  (0.0223)  (0.0253)  (0.0271) (0.0291)  (0.0233)  (0.0189) 
No. Blocks  5 4  8  5  5 5  4  5 
Bal. prop.y satisfied (1%)  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Common support
1  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of treated  88  67  81  127  66  60  68  79 
No. of untreated  71  68  42  44  71  36  113  95 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant term (not reported) included. 
1This restriction implies that the test is performed only on the observations whose propensity score belongs to the intersection of the supports of the propensity score of schools with and without school with poor building conditions 
 supports of the propensity score of schools with and without school with poor building conditions 